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BANKING SECRECY TODAY
WERNER DE CAPITANI*
For a Swiss bank lawyer, there is hardly a more frustrating topic
to write about than bank secrecy. It seems impossible to dispel miscon-
ceptions about banking secrecy and its constant and unavoidable com-
panion, the totally inaccessible anonymous numbered account. Even
sophisticated people tend to believe the dramatic depictions of crime
novelists. Official United States sources inevitably resort to the epithet
"blocking statute" when they deal with Swiss bank secrecy provisions.
In an April 30, 1987 speech before the Asociacion Bancaria de
Panama, the author describes the historical background of the secrecy
law, and he shows that financial privacy is a common feature in many
European countries. Particular attention is given to the controversial
situation existing between the United States and Switzerland. This
controversy has lost much of its previous tension due to the Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. The author does not expand
in detail on the legal limitations of bank secrecy in the various fields
of law; for this he refers to Bernhard F. Meyer's article, Swiss Bank-
ing Secrecy And Its Legal Implications in the United States, 18 NEw
ENG. L. REV. 18 (1978), which is still fairly accurate.
To address the Asociacion Bancaria de Panama at your Sixth In-
ternational Banking Convention is an honor, a privilege, and, of course,
a responsibility.
My task will not be easy, because I understand you are a geo-
graphically mixed audience. The approach to the topic of banking se-
crecy depends very much on where the event takes place. If the audi-
ence is German, I can rely on the fact that the audience is familiar with
the basic facts of bank secrecy and, more importantly, that its attitude
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towards bank secrecy is more or less friendly and sympathetic.' The
situation is of course totally different if the audience is, for example,
North American.' My primary task is to dispel fundamental misunder-
standings, and my aim is to de-dramatize the topic and to demonstrate
that bank secrecy is not a bulwark the size of the Swiss Alps behind
which all the dirty money in this world is hidden, and that it is not
even a blocking statute enacted to thwart the difficult job of foreign
magistrates.
Your Organizing Committee suggested that I should speak about
the current international state of bank secrecy. I am flattered and at the
same time distressed to see the extent to which you overestimate my
capabilities. Rather, I will focus on the situation in Switzerland and
then try to establish whether some generally applicable conclusions may
be drawn from the Swiss example.
The individual right to privacy is a basic concept of democracies.
It has perhaps greater significance in the countries of the European
continent than elsewhere, because Europeans have been involved in a
century-long struggle against the aggressions of authoritarian regimes.
Financial privacy - which embraces bank secrecy - is an insep-
arable part of this concept of privacy. This is supported by old sources.
Edouard Chambost is the author of a rather pleasurable and not alto-
gether serious book about bank secrets.' If we can believe him, the most
ancient hint of the bank secret can be found in the Code of Hammu-
rabi, a law book written, or rather carved, in stone 4000 years ago in
Babylon. Unfortunately, I am not fluent with that language and was
not able to check whether Chambost's interpretation makes sense. But
the first controllable and unmistakable secrecy provision is laid down in
the rules of the Banco Ambrosiano Milano of 1593. They say that the
banker who violates his secrecy duty shall lose his license. In 1619, a
similar clause was adopted by the Hamburger Bank," and subse-
quently, the secrecy obligation was more and more frequently applied
until, in the nineteenth century, it became a routine clause in the Arti-
cles of Association of German banks. It is an undeniable fact that in
Europe the secrecy duty has been an essential component of the
banker/client relationship for centuries.
In Switzerland, the first private, savings banks were established in
the eighteenth century. They had only local significance. Geneva,
I See E. CHAMBOST, BANK ACCOUNTS: A WORLD GUIDE TO CONFIDENTIALITY
115 (P. Walton & M. Thompson eds. 1983).
2 See id. at 98.
'Id.
' See id. at 115.
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though, was already an important banking center by 1780. The real
upswing started only fifty years later when the financial needs of in-
dustrialization and the construction of the railroads had to be met.
Credit Suisse, for example, as the oldest of the "Big Three" banks in
Switzerland, was established in 1856. Towards the end of the nine-
teenth century, banking laws were enacted in several cantons.' Federal
legislation was tackled only when several banks faced enormous liquid-
ity problems and nearly failed as a result of massive savings withdraw-
als at the outbreak of World War I. Legislation, however, was delayed
until after the depression of 1929, and the Swiss Banking Law was not
enacted until 1934.1 Not surprisingly, it contains a secrecy provision,7
because we share the conviction that discretion is an essential element
of banking in any country where the personal liberty of the individual
is recognized.
The present version of the secrecy provision dates from 1971.8 In
1971, the Swiss Banking Law was overhauled. The secrecy provision
was modernized, but only formally. In substance, it did not undergo
any change. One may ask, why was the secrecy duty coupled with
criminal sanctions? There are two explanations.
The well-known explanation is that the penalty provision was in-
tended to deter the Nazis from spying out accounts in Swiss banks.'
The world economic crisis had led to a significant capital flight from
Germany to Switzerland. As a reply, Germany introduced foreign ex-
5 Cantons are the individual states of the Swiss Confederation.
' Federal Law Relating to Banks and Savings Banks of November 8, 1934,
amended by Federal Law of March 11, 1971, Systematische Sammlung des
Bundesrechts [SR] 952.0, Recueil systematique du droit f~d&al [RS] 952.0 (Switz.)
[hereinafter Banking Law of 1934].
Banking Law of 1934, art. 47, which reads as follows:
1. Whoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as officer,
employee, authorized agent, liquidator or commissioner of a bank, as a
representative of the Banking Commission, officer or employee of a recog-
nized auditing company, or who has become aware of such a secret in this
capacity; and whoever tries to induce others to violate professional secrecy,
shall be punished by a prison term not to exceed six months or by a fine
not exceeding SFr 50,000.
2. If the act has been committed by negligence, the penalty shall be a fine
not exceeding SFr 30,000.
3. The violation of professional secrecy remains punishable even after ter-
mination of the official or employment relationship or the exercise of the
profession.
4. Federal and cantonal regulations concerning the obligation to testify
and to furnish information to a government authority shall remain
reserved.
8 See supra note 6.
' See Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United
States, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 18, 26 (1978).
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change controls on August 1, 1931. Immediately afterwards, several
German agents were caught trying to obtain information from Swiss
bank employees. The situation was aggravated considerably after
Hitler had gained power in 1933, and a German law was enacted
which served the purpose of confiscating Jewish property.10 German
citizens were forced to sign waivers authorizing German officials to col-
lect information from Swiss banks. The Swiss National Bank inter-
vened swiftly and prohibited the giving of information. But this did not
impress the foreign agents, because there was no provision declaring
these activities punishable. Therefore, the bank secrecy criminal provi-
sion was rushed through at the very last moment.
A less heroic, but equally likely version reads as follows: One of
the Swiss statutes which experienced a particularly wearisome and long
ripening period was the Penal Code. 1 Its first drafts dated from the
19th century, but it was only ratified in 1937 and enacted as of Janu-
ary 1, 1942.12 The Penal Code contains, of course, provisions about
business secrets and the secrecy duty of lawyers, doctors and clergymen.
When the Swiss government transmitted the Banking Act bill to the
Parliament, it indicated that the penal provisions of the Banking Act
were drafted along the same lines as the Penal Code bill, whose enact-
ment was still far away. So it was possibly merely a question of time
saving that Switzerland has its secrecy provision in the Banking Act.
Let me add that the Swiss are still convinced that financial confidential-
ity is something we want and need. A legislative initiative of the Social-
ist Party aimed at substantially weakening the bank secrecy provisions
was rejected in 1984 by the Swiss voters by a three to one margin.
This observation gives me the opportunity to make some general
remarks. It has become customary for certain countries to be singled
out and blamed for protecting their bank secrecy duties with criminal
penalties, and you may take it for granted that Panama, Switzerland
and Luxembourg are mentioned as the primary examples. This choice
is absolutely arbitrary. If we neglect those newly created financial cen-
ters - which are usually situated on an island not too far from a real
financial center and which try to boost their attraction by providing
draconic penalties for secrecy violations - then there remain at least
the following countries which hardly ever are scolded even though their
Banking Laws also provide criminal sanctions for the breach of the
10 See id.
11 1937 SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB], CODE PENAL SUISSE,
[Cp], amended by RS 311.0.
12 See F. DESSEMONTET & T. ANSAY, INTRODUCTION TO Swiss LAW 214
(1981).
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secrecy duty: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Mexico, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, and Turkey.13 Likewise, it is important to note that several
countries whose banking laws do not contain a particular secrecy clause
regard the bank secrecy as a business secret like the secret of an attor-
ney whose violation is punishable in the terms of the "normal" Penal
Code. Among these countries are France, Greece, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, and Spain."'
The number of reputable countries where the violation of bank
secrecy entails criminal sanctions is quite impressive. One country,
though, is patently missing: Italy, where the first mention of bank se-
crecy and the consequences for breach of it were made. I do not pretend
that it is a cogent result of this, but I want you to know that the Banco
Ambrosiano, the bank which I mentioned earlier as the first bank oper-
ating under a secrecy duty, is presently being wound up.
At this point, let me drop one or two words about the civil sanc-
tions. Frequently, lists are also drawn itemizing the countries where
you can sue your bank for damages if it breached its secrecy duty to-
wards you. In my opinion, these lists are of little value. In the first
place, I cannot imagine that, where confidentiality is an element of the
banker/customer relationship, a breach of such confidentiality does not
constitute a contract and therefore automatically entitles you to a dam-
age claim. But then, I am hard put to give you examples of what the
damages would be. In my career, I have never come across a case
where a violation of the bank secrecy resulted in a recoverable damage.
Likewise, I am hard put to give you a definition or rather a
description of the term "bank secret." The Banking Law itself simply
speaks of "bank secret" without specifying what actually is meant. The
general opinion is that bank secrecy covers all aspects of the banker/
client relationship unless they are publicly known. Obviously, this is a
very vague description, and the border zones are correspondingly large.
Let us now turn to the scope of Swiss bank secrecy. In this respect,
we are confronted with two phenomena: one is the still widespread be-
lief that the banker's discretion is absolute, and the other one is the
exultant cry which we expect to read at least once every year in the
United States newspapers, "Swiss banking secrecy cracked." Where lies
the truth?
It is difficult to judge today what the drafters of the secrecy clause
had in mind in 1934, and I would not totally exclude that, under the
" See generally E. CHAMBOST, supra note 1 (giving a general review of the bank
secrecy laws of the above mentioned nations).
14 Id. The information supporting this list was gathered in 1984 and may no
longer be accurate.
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then prevailing conditions, they wanted to give it a very broad field of
application. But I cannot imagine that they intended to build up an
obstacle which would have resisted even a Swiss criminal investigation.
Anyway, all this is guesswork, because there are absolutely no sources
available.
When I joined Credit Suisse in 1962, it was clear that the secrecy
duty could be overridden by many information duties. I do not intend
to bore you with technicalities, and I restrict myself to saying that all
persons or authorities who represent the customer by operation of law
are entitled to full information. This includes the heirs and/or the ex-
ecutor of the will or the administrator of the estate, the guardian, and
also the Bankruptcy Office, which in my country is a public institution.
Moreover, the secrecy clause of the Banking Law expressly states that
the Swiss procedural regulations concerning the duty to testify take pre-
cedence over the secrecy duty, and this means, generally speaking, that
a banker is bound to testify or to produce documents both in civil litiga-
tion and in criminal cases. 5 I said "generally speaking," for the situa-
tion is rather intricate due to the fact that in our Confederation we
have dozens of different codes of procedure, and each one looks differ-
ent. It is fair to say, however, that in all major cantons, bankers are
now under the duty to testify. If we step back twenty-five years, this
applied only to Swiss litigation and Swiss criminal investigations. In
the area of international legal assistance, no one bound by a profes-
sional discretionary duty could be forced to testify. The reason was that
this international cooperation was volunteered and lacked a formal stat-
utory basis.
This sounds terrible, but it was not. In fact, in the early sixties,
the Swiss banks were still nice little entities with predominantly domes-
tic businesses and little enthusiasm to go international. When Credit
Suisse celebrated its one hundredth anniversary in 1956, it boasted a
balance sheet total of SFr 3 billion in comparison with SFr 103 billion
today, it had 2,600 employees compared with 14,000 now, and it con-
sisted of 26 branches as opposed to about 200 branches and affiliates in
Switzerland plus 69 abroad today. The outlook which concluded the
commemorative book published on that occasion cast a suspicious
glance at the economic boom of the years after World War II, caution-
ing that this could not go on forever and hailing the banks' determina-
15 See Comment, The Effect of Swiss Bank Secrecy on the Enforcement of Insider
Trading Regulations and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United
States and Switzerland, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 541, 551 (1984); Comment,
The Conflict Between United States Securities Laws on Insider Trading and Swiss
Bank Secrecy Laws, 7 Nw. U.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 318, 330 (1985).
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tion to give domestic business precedence over risky international expo-
sure. As before, this pessimistic forecast was swept away by the turn of
events. In the "Roaring Sixties," the banking business soared to unex-
pected dimensions, certainly not as a result of domestic growth, but
rather as a result of a totally new scenario. This scenario arose when
the continents moved closer together and when international trade and,
simultaneously, international crime climbed to unanticipated heights.
This new situation soon led to clashes about Swiss bank secrecy,
almost exclusively with the United States. The situation in Europe was
under control. In 1966, Switzerland joined the European Convention
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,"' which provided a basis
for assistance to all Western European countries.
As for the United States, I wish to avoid the impression that they
played a role as arch-villains. To a certain extent, it was predictable
that problems arose. The United States played a predominant role in
our export trade, the Swiss banks had built up a strong presence in the
United States, and we were faced with a legal system which in our
European eyes was tinged with a good bit of chauvinism, if this word
may be used in this connection.
It is true that our first friction with the United States goes back to
earlier times. Immediately after World War II, the Americans endeav-
ored to trace and to seize German assets allegedly hidden in Swiss
banks. In this controversy, however, bank secrecy was not the central
issue. The main problem was that the Swiss Government said it was
unable to recognize the legal basis of the claims. Eventually, the situa-
tion was dealt with on a political level by the conclusion of various
international agreements.
One last offshoot of the post-war period was the Interhandel case,
in the United States called Societe Internationale v. Rogers.1 7 Inter-
handel sued the United States to recover property which had been con-
sidered Nazi-controlled and seized by the Alien Property Custodian. In
the course of the discovery proceedings, the United States requested
records of a Swiss bank in an effort to prove that the bank had con-
spired with Interhandel in order to disguise German ownership of the
assets. The bank refused, and the situation became even more compli-
cated when the Swiss Government enjoined production of the records.
The United States Supreme Court held that the fear of criminal prose-
cution excused the bank's noncompliance with the discovery request."8
"6 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, concluded
April 20, 1959, 472 U.N.T.S. 185.
17 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
1s Id. at 211-12.
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Many years later the case was settled. The assets in question were sold
and the sales price divided among the parties.
Then followed the period of the valiant crusade of District Attor-
ney Robert M. Morgenthau against foreign "secret" bank accounts.
His efforts were spectacular, but probably doomed to failure from the
very beginning, for already in 1968 Switzerland and the United States
had earnestly begun to negotiate a legal assistance treaty. These negoti-
ations lasted five years. After signature of the treaty by both countries
in 1973, it became effective on January 23, 1977." 9 During its lifetime,
the treaty has been used by the United States close to 500 times. The
treaty contains a highly unusual chapter about legal assistance in cases
of organized crime which was introduced at the vigorous insistence of
the Americans.2" Interestingly, this chapter has rarely been used. What
unfortunately has become most important is legal assistance in connec-
tion with drug trafficking.
The United States enjoyed its preferential treatment for only six
years, because in 1981, the Swiss Law on International Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters (IMAC)2" was enacted. This law gives all
countries essentially equal opportunity to obtain legal assistance from
Switzerland, including the production of bank records. Obviously, the
foreign request must meet certain standards. In the first place, the rele-
vant facts of the case must show that the offense prosecuted in the re-
questing country contains all the elements of an offense punishable in
Switzerland.22 In other words, if assistance is sought for an act which is
not punishable in my country, the standard of dual criminality is not
met, and a banker cannot be forced to testify. In addition, the IMAC
provides certain exceptions where no legal assistance is granted. These
include cases which may have a predominantly political character and
military justice proceedings.2"
These cases, however, may also include, in the terminology of the
IMAC, offenses which appear to be aimed at minimizing taxes or
which violate regulations concerning currency, trade, or economic pol-
icy.24 Does this mean that legal assistance is excluded in tax cases? Not
" Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27
U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter U.S.-Swiss Treaty].
20 Id., chapter II, 27 U.S.T. at 2031-34.
21 Bundesgesetz 6ber internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen [Swiss Federal
Law on International Assistance in Criminal Matters], 1981 SR 351.1, 1981 RS 351.1,
art. 67 [hereinafter IMAC].
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
[Vol. 10:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss1/2
BANKING SECRECY
at all. We make the following distinction: tax evasion (which means the
simple failure to declare or to pay taxes) is not a criminal offense in
Switzerland, but only a misdemeanor. If the Swiss tax authorities ac-
cuse a taxpayer of tax evasion, they have no means for requesting the
production of bank records. So if we refuse to grant international legal
assistance in these instances, this only means that foreign tax authori-
ties are put on the same level as their Swiss counterparts. The situa-
tion, however, is different in cases of tax fraud. Fraudulent conduct
means the use of such devices as counterfeited or forged documents of
all sorts including inflated invoices, manipulated balance sheets or even
advices reflecting a date which is not the date of execution. Such behav-
ior is considered criminal, and accordingly legal assistance can be
obtained.
Incidentally, this is also true as far as the famous numbered ac-
counts are concerned. A numbered account is an absolutely normal ac-
count. There is only one technical difference: its holder is only known
to a restricted number of personnel. It is a safety measure which
reduces the risk of inadvertent or intentional divulgence, but the iden-
tity of the customer is as carefully checked as in any normal case. This
does not, of course, exclude the risk that a numbered account is opened
for a black sheep, and then the Lord have mercy upon the bank in-
volved - the media certainly will not.
It would seem that the legitimate expectations of prosecutors all
over the world have been met to a large extent. Information including
disclosure of bank records can be obtained from Switzerland in almost
all cases which are considered as crimes. However, peace has by no
means come yet. The latest round with the Americans was about in-
sider trading, which is not punishable yet in Switzerland. I would ex-
aggerate if I said that I enjoyed the attacks of the SEC against Swiss
banks in the St. Joe Minerals25 and Santa Fe26 cases. On the other
hand, they had the gratifying effect of reanimating the Swiss insider
bill which had fallen into oblivion since it first was rather lamely dis-
cussed more than ten years ago. The Swiss legislation machine is ex-
tremely slow, and the insider bill, which allegedly was given preferen-
tial treatment, is still under discussion. In order to bridge the gap, the
Swiss government; the SEC and the Swiss Bankers Association joined
25 SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
28 SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and Call Op-
tions for the Common Stock of, Santa Fe Int'l Corp., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,424 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1983), settlement announced [1985-
1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,484 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1986),
affd, 817 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1987).
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their efforts and established an Agreement which is known as Conven-
tion XVI.27 It allows the SEC to obtain bank records reflecting stock
exchange transactions, if the SEC establishes that, within twenty-five
days prior to the announcement of the merger, tender offer or similar
matter, material price or volume movements have occurred in a particu-
lar stock.
2 8
A special Swiss Commission will investigate the matter and release
the information to the SEC if the customer involved and/or his bank
are not able to convince the Commission that he was not an insider or
benefitting from inside information. This Agreement has been in force
since January 1, 1983, and apparently the Commission has handled
several cases. The SEC has declared its satisfaction with this procedure
and its results. In Switzerland, in turn, the Convention has faced criti-
cism. It is neither a law nor a treaty, and many scholars believe that
the bank secrecy should not be lifted by what seems to be a private
agreement. Anyway, we expect the insider provision to be enacted in
the Penal Code within the next ten months.2 9 Then the Convention
27 Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association with regard to the Handling
of Requests for Information from the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
United States on the Subject of Misuse of Inside Information, January 1, 1983, 22
I.L.M. 7 (1983) [hereinafter Convention XVI].
28 Id. at 7-8.
"' STGB, art. 161, Cp, art. 161 (The law is expected to be enacted in mid-1988.
The expiration for the time to hold an opposition referendum is April 11, 1988.).
The following is a translation of art. 161:
EXPLOITATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF CONFIDENTIAL
FACTS
1. Whoever as a member of a board of directors, of a manage-
ment, of an auditing body or as an agent of a stock corporation or of
a corporation controlling such stock corporation or depending from
it, as a member of a public authority or as a public officer, or as the
auxiliary of the above named persons, obtains a pecuniary advan-
tage for himself or a third person by exploiting the knowledge of a
confidential fact which, when becoming known, will in a foreseeable
way have a considerable influence on the market price of shares,
other securities or corresponding ledger securities of the corporation
or of options traded in Switzerland on a Stock Exchange or on a
pre-Stock Exchange market, or who reveals such fact to a third per-
son, shall be punished with imprisonment or with a fine.
2. Whoever becomes informed directly or indirectly on such a fact
by one of the persons referred to in section 1 and who obtains a
pecuniary advantage for himself or a third person by exploiting this
information, shall be punished with imprisonment of up to one year
or with a fine.
3. Are to be considered as facts in the meaning of section 2 and 3
a forthcoming issue of new equity participations, a consolidation of
companies or a similar fact of comparable bearing.
4. If the consolidation of two stock corporations is planned, then
sections 1 to 3 apply to both corporations.
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will automatically expire, and, not only the SEC, but securities regula-
tors of all countries will have the opportunity to obtain information
about suspected insider transactions.
The most recent legislative activity in Switzerland concerns money
laundering. A preliminary bill has been released for comments. I can-
not predict yet how long it will take until this bill becomes the law.
There is another point which leads to frustration. It has to do with
the impatience of prosecutors. I take the liberty to quote a passage from
a speech which the Swiss Ambassador to the United States made two
months ago before the Washington Foreign Law Society:
It will probably not come as a big surprise that especially in
this country with its penchant for instant gratification prose-
cutors often regard judicial assistance as not much more than
a time consuming nuisance and are therefore tempted to try
so-called unilateral measures - in clear language they try to
confiscate assets of a bank in this country in order to pres-
sure that bank to deliver the requested evidence from Swit-
zerland. Needless to say that this is a surefire way to unpro-
ductive confrontation. It is unavoidable that obtaining
evidence abroad is a bit more complicated, yes, maybe more
cumbersome and time consuming than the taking of evidence
domestically. It is a price worth paying to avoid confronta-
tion. Nevertheless it is obvious that the delays inherent in
foreign assistance procedures have to be reasonable. Other-
wise this instrument ceases to be a valid and efficient way
for legitimate law enforcement. The Swiss authorities have
recognized that fact and envisage to undertake several in part
quite far reaching steps to streamline the procedure. It is
clear, however, that concerns for due process, a concept I do
not have to explain to Americans, put a certain limit to this
endeavor.30
I wish to add here a story which came quite recently to my atten-
tion and which I find rather amusing. It has to do with the investiga-
tion of the United States House Select Committee in the Iran/Contra
affair. A formal United States request for information was received
5. Sections 1 to 4 apply by analogy if the exploitation of the
knowledge of a confidential fact relates to shares, other securities,
ledger securities or corresponding options of a co-operative associa-
tion or of a foreign company.
30 Address by Klaus Jacobi, Ambassador of Switzerland to the United States of
America, at the Annual Dinner of the Washington Foreign Law Society (Feb. 20,
1987) (emphasis in original).
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long ago, and I believe the information will be released very soon.
However, the House Committee carries its own investigation, and it
requested to receive information on its own. The request was politely
turned down, because the Treaty says that all United States requests
have to emanate from the United States Attorney General and his
designates, which is also the office which receives the information from
Switzerland."1 Apparently, this reaction was taken badly by members
of the staff of the House Committee, and the Swiss were accused of
unfairly hiding behind the Treaty and invited to change their laws. We
certainly should not overestimate this incident; on the other hand, it
demonstrates how difficult it can become to operate in an area where
the prosecution of the law is soaked with questions of prestige and, as I
believe, also of publicity.
Incidentally, both the IMAC and the Swiss law implementing the
Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States provide that a legal
assistance request can be preceded by a request for a temporary block-
ing order, which can rather summarily be motivated and is not subject
to the requirements concerning form and content which are applicable
to the actual request for assistance.32 Under these conditions, I cannot
find any justification for the unilateral domestic steps which the Am-
bassador mentioned.
Ladies and gentlemen, you are probably surprised at my zeal to
demonstrate the many ways that exist for "cracking" the bank secrecy,
and you may wonder whether, after all, it is true that the secrecy is like
a Swiss cheese: full of holes. Well, I like the comparison, because a
high-quality Swiss cheese must have plenty of holes, and without holes,
nobody would relish it. Let me make one thing plain: the Swiss bank
secret was always intended to protect privacy from illegitimate assaults,
and it was never intended to protect illegal behavior from legitimate
investigation. If you understand bank secrecy in this basic conceptual
sense, it has not undergone any change. It is exactly in this spirit that
the Swiss banks established an ethical code with rules of good conduct
in bank management ten years ago.
Banks undertake careful examination of the identity of their cus-
tomers, including the beneficial owners of domiciliary companies.
Anonymous accounts do not exist in Switzerland. Bank counter trans-
actions normally do not require identification of the counterparty. You
can exchange currency or buy gold coins without revealing who you
U.S.-Swiss Treaty supra note 17, at 2050.
32 Bundesgesetz zum Staatsvertrag mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika iiber
gegenseitige Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen [Swiss Federal Law on the United States-Swiss
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters], 1975 SR 351.93, 1975 RS 351.93.
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are. In order to diminish potential misuse of such cash transactions,
banks will not accept amounts of SFr 500,000 or more without check-
ing the identity of the bearer. This sum will be lowered to SFr 100,000
in October of this year. The banks also will not actively assist attempts
at tax evasion or capital transfers from countries with exchange con-
trols. The tax evasion undertaking means basically that only records
shall be given to the customer which are made in the ordinary course of
business and which reflect, without omissions or alterations, all transac-
tions that were carried out. The provision aims at preventing ad hoc
statements from being produced which could aptly be used to deceive
the tax authorities. The agreement is by no means a paper tiger. Non-
compliance carries fines of up to SFr 10 million (corresponding today
to U.S. $7 million).
This code of conduct shows how we in Switzerland understand
bank secrecy. We believe that the concept of discretion as such is right
and must be maintained. But the form in which it takes shape needs
continuous review and, if necessary, adjustment to a changing environ-
ment. Take insider trading. Not so terribly long ago, insider trading
was, perhaps grudgingly, regarded as a possibility for a company's top
management to gain a super-bonus. Public opinion has changed; such
behavior is not simply unfair, but inconsistent with our sense of justice.
Prompt action has to be taken in order to ensure that insider trading
cannot benefit any longer from the protection of bank secrecy. Such
flexibility is not the result of modern insights. It goes in line with the
maxim which the Greek philosopher Heraclitus coined 2500 years ago:
Panta rhei - everything is always in motion. I think it would be dis-
astrous for bank secrecy if it would be treated as a static and unchang-
ing principle. New challenges have already surfaced. The United King-
dom Companies Act gives any company the right to request
information about its genuine shareholders. 3 Virtually all shares of
United Kingdom companies which are deposited with Swiss banks are
registered in the names of nominees. How do we react if a company
requests identification of the real shareholder? The situation is even
more delicate since criminal behavior plays no role at all. We are pres-
ently examining what could and what should be done in order to com-
ply with the company's legitimate information request without sacrific-
ing the client's likewise legitimate privacy. Perhaps this problem should
not be overestimated, and perhaps bank secrecy will become more and
more insignificant. Today, strict bank secrecy is not enough to make a
country an important financial center. Today, the big clients are the
33 Companies Act, 1985, ch. 8, § 212 (U.K.).
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institutional investors. They are not particularly interested in discre-
tion, but are in quest of efficient service and performance, and in addi-
tion, they will attach great importance to such factors as political, eco-
nomic and monetary stability, free flow of money, avoidance of red
tape, and the high rating of the financial institutions with whom they
deal.
Nonetheless, bank secrecy as a shield from unjustified invasion of
privacy will not altogether lose its importance, and in that respect will
continue to add to the attractiveness of any reputable financial center.
Panama, April 30, 1987
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss1/2
